The Nizkor Project: Remembering the Holocaust (Shoah)

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                                                  [Page 181]



THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States.
Mr. Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better,
for the purpose of the Tribunal, in citing documents if you
would refer to them not only by the United States Exhibit
number and the PS Exhibit number, but also by the document
book identification. Each document book, as I understand it,
has either a letter or a number.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Court please, I am not familiar with
the identification numbers of the document book. I suppose
the clerk can give them to me.

THE PRESIDENT: They are numbered alphabetically, I think.


THE PRESIDENT: If that is not done, when we have got a great
number of document books before us, it is very difficult to
find where the particular exhibit is.

MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.

May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected
documents which I presented yesterday constitute a cross-
section of the aggressive war case as a whole. They do not
purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the
aggressive war case. In effect they amount to a running
account of the entire matter.

Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it
might be helpful to pause at this point to present to the
Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the
key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The
Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of
some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a
background for some of the evidence which remains to be
introduced. I am quite certain that, as your minds go back
to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time
to time in the public Press as these tremendous movements
developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have
formed the concept as I did, in those days, of the gradually
developing head of a wolf.

In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He
lacks a lower jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf
moved forward and took over Austria (the Anschluss) - that
red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the
wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia
was already, with its head and the main part of its body, in
the mouth of the wolf.

Then on chart two, you see the mountainous portions, the
fortified portions of Czechoslovakia. In red you see the
Sudetenland territories which were first taken over by the
Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia's head became
diminutive in the mouth of the wolf.

And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red with
its neck practically broken, and all that was necessary was
the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia, and the wolf's head
became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows
indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course,

That is the visual picture that I have never been able to
wipe out of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the
inevitability of everything that went along after the taking
over of Austria.

The detailed, more or less chronological presentation of the
aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct
sections. The first section is that concerning preparation
for aggression during the period Of 1933 to 1936, roughly.
The second section deals with aggression against Austria.
The third section deals with aggression against
Czechoslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression
against Poland and the initiation of actual war. For reasons
of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be
presented after the British Chief Prosecutor

                                                  [Page 182]

presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth
section deals with the expansion of the war into a general
war of aggression by invasions into Scandinavia, the
Lowlands and the Balkans. The details on this section of the
case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The
sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet
Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of
convenience again, the details of this section, like the
details on aggression against Poland, will be presented
after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement
to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with
collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression
against the United States.

I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the
case concerning preparation for aggression during the period
1933 to 1936. The particular section of the Indictment to
which this discussion addresses itself is Paragraph IV (F)
and sub-Paragraph 2 a), (b), (c), (d), (e), f), which I need
not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the
allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make
reference to certain provisions to the Charter and to
certain provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty between the United
States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25th
August, 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine
Treaty of Locarno of 16th October, 1925.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this
document book should have some identifying letter or number?

MR. ALDEIZMAN: I suppose it should have, sir, yes. I don't
know what the proper letter is.

THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't anybody know?

MR. ALDERMAN: "M,"I am informed.


MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. I do not offer those treaties in evidence
at this time, because the British will offer all the
pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case.

The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after
World War I. Their modest origin aid rather fantastic nature
and the fact that they could have been interrupted at
numerous points do not detract from the continuity of the
planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment, on the
theory that it covers events from 1933 to 1945, does not
dissociate these events from what occurred in the entire
preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of Hitler and the
Nazis to political power in 1933 was already a well advanced
milestone on the German road to progress.

By 1933 the Nazi Party, the N.S.D.A.P., had reached very
substantial proportions. At that time their plans called for
the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was
indispensable for the consolidation within the country of
all the internal resources and potentialities.

As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful
progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next
step was to become disengaged from some of the external
disadvantages of existing international limitations and
obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were
a bar to the development of strength in all the fields
necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been
an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the
very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations
under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions
adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty
of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the
development of the extensive military power which they had
to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same
plan and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the
Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It
was impossible to carry out their plans on the basis of
existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind
of future commitments.

The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the
Indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the
Tribunal to take Judicial notice.

                                                  [Page 183]

It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic
operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful co-
ordination of all participating forces. At the same time
each point was part of a long prepared plan of aggression.
Each represents a necessary step in the direction of the
specific aggression which was subsequently committed.

To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be an
unnecessary labouring of the obvious. What I intend to
effect is, largely, the bringing to light of information
disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto

The three things of immediate international significance
referred to in this paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment
are: first, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference
and the League of Nations; second, the institution of
compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of
the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps
was progressively more serious than the matter of
international relations. In each of these steps Germany
anticipated the possibility of sanctions being applied by
other countries, and, in particular, a strong military
action from France with the possible assistance of England.
However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less
than a preventative war would stop them, and they also
estimated correctly that no one, or combination of the Great
Powers would undertake the responsibility for such a war.
The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the
League of Nations was, of course, an action that did not
violate any international obligation. The League Covenant
provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case
and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these
actions cannot be dissociated from the general conspiracy
and the plans for aggression. The announcement of the
institution of universal military service was a more daring
action with a more overt significance. It was a violation of
Versailles, but they got away with it. Then came the
outright military defiance, the occupation of the
demilitarised zone of the Rhineland.

The Indictment, in paragraph IV (F) 2, alleges that the Nazi
conspirators determined to remove the restrictions of
Versailles, and the fact that their plans in this respect
started very early is confirmed by their own statements,
indeed they boasted about their long planning and careful

I read to you yesterday at length, from our document 789PS,
exhibit USA 23, Hitler's speech to all Supreme Commanders,
Of 23rd November, 1939, I need not read it again. He stated
there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles.
After four years of actual war, the defendant Jodl, as Chief
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an
address to the Reich and to tire Gauleiters in which he
traced the development of German strength. The seizure of
power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty,
including conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and
rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armour and air

I have, if the Tribunal please, our document L-172. It is a
photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I
offer that photostat as exhibit USA 34. I shall read, if the
Tribunal please, only a part of that, but will start at the

The speech is entitled  "The Strategic Position in the
Beginning of the 5th Year of War." It is a kind of
retrospective summary by the defendant, General Jodl. "A
lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces (West) to the Reich and Gau Leaders, delivered in
Munich on the 7th November, 1943."

THE PRESIDENT: Are you reading from the document now?

MR. ALDERMAN: I am reading from the English translation.

THE PRESIDENT: But in my copy Of L-172, as far as I can see,
it begins with the word "Introduction".

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes Sir, I was just coming to the
Introduction. On my copy -

MR. PRESIDENT: There is another heading, too?


                                                  [Page 184]

THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got that.

MR. ALDERMAN: You have an index, I think. There is not one
on my copy: Page 3.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the index doesn't give that heading;
that is all.

MR. ALDERMAN: I see, I am sorry.

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't matter.


   "Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to
   give you a review to-day of the strategic position in
   the beginning of the 5th Year of War.
   I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I
   undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to
   do it justice with a few generalities. It is not
   necessary to say openly what it is. No one, the Fuehrer
   has ordered, may know more or be told more than he needs
   for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all
   in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in
   order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your
   Gaus, after all, and among their inhabitants that all
   the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious
   rumours concentrate, that try to find a place among our
   people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion
   strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as
   they call it - a political solution. They say, we must
   negotiate while there is still something in hand, and
   all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural
   sense of the people, who know well that in this war
   there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation would
   mean the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against
   this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need
   more than force. You need to know the true situation,
   and for this reason I believe that I am justified in
   giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account of
   the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of
   secrets, butt a weapon which may perhaps help you to
   fortify the morale of the people. For this war will be
   decided not only by force of arms but by the will to
   resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918
   not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not
   military defeat but moral defeat. She broke down
   internally. The result has been not the peace she
   expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal
   traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than
   continuation of the war at our side would have brought
   her. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, since I give concrete
   figures and data concerning our own strength, to treat
   these details as your secret; all the rest is at your
   disposal, without restriction, for application in your
   activities as leaders of the people.
   Our necessity and objectives were clear to all and
   everyone at the moment when we entered upon this War of
   Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried
   the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from
   the Western Powers. Our further incursions into
   Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and
   in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts
   concerning the general conduct of the war, so long as we
   were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs
   were encountered and our general Situation began to
   become increasingly active, that the German people began
   to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more
   than we could do and had set our aims too high. To
   provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you
   with certain points of view for use in your own
   explanatory activities, is one of the main points of my
   present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
   I. A review of the most important developments up to the
   II. Consideration of the present situation.
   III. The foundation of our morale and our confidence in
   In view of my position as Military Adviser to the
   Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the
   problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully
   appreciating at the same time that in view of the
   Protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be
   giving expression to only one side of events.

                                                  [Page 185]
   1.The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its
   struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage
   of the external liberation from the bonds of the Dictate
   of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this
   circle. I should like however to mention at this point
   how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realise what
   an important part has been played by the National-
   Socialist Movement in re-awakening the will to fight
   (the "Wehrwillen"); in nurturing fighting strength (the
   "Wehrkraft") and in rearming the German people. In spite
   of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small
   "Reichswehr" would never have been able to cope with
   this task alone, if only because of its own restricted
   radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at -
   and has so happily been successful in bringing about -
   was the fusion of these two forces.
   2. "The seizure of power."

I invite the Tribunal's attention to the frequency with
which that expression occurs in all of these documents-"the
seizure of power by the Nazi Party in its turn has meant, in
the first place, the restoration of fighting sovereignty.
"That is the German word "Wehrhoheit" - a kind of euphemism
there - the "Highness of Defence." I think it really means
"Fighting Sovereignty." "Wehrhoheit" also meant
conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and re-armament,
with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern
armoured and air arm.

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